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NOTES
Equal Protection and the First Amendment:
Zoning Away Skid Row
A recent United States Supreme Court decigion upheld a
Detroit zoning ordinance on equal protection grounds even
though the ordinance regulated free speech. The article examines
the traditional equal protection analyses and the relationship
between the first amendment and equal protection clause. Al-
though he agrees with the Court's decision, the author is critical
of the Court's failure to explicitly delineate its standards of re-
view in equal protection cases.
Operators of two "adult" motion picture theatres sued in fed-
eral district court' for enforcement of their right to establish "adult"
theatres in certain areas of Detroit where a zoning ordinance barred
their location.' Designed to preserve neighborhoods, the ordinance
prohibited the establishment of "adult" theatres and bookstores
within 1000 feet of any other "regulated use." The district court held
the ordinance valid as advancing Detroit's expressed compelling
interest in preserving neighborhoods and as imposing only a slight
incidental burden on first amendment conduct.' The Court of Ap-
peals for the Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that the ordinance,
because it classified the affected businesses solely on the basis of the
content of the materials which they purveyed, was invalid under the
equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment despite the
city's having established that concentrations of such businesses
tended to have deleterious effects on surrounding neighborhoods.4
On certiorari, the United States Supreme Court held, reversed: A
1. Nortown Theatre, Inc. v. Gribbs, 373 F. Supp. 363 (E.D. Mich. 1974). Nortown
Theatre, Inc., American Mini Theatres, and Variety Books, Inc. filed separate civil actions
which were consolidated for decision at both the district and circuit court levels.
2. DETROIT, MICH., OFFICIAL ZONING ORDINANCES art. 743-46 (1972). This ordinance was
passed as an amendment to a 1962 enactment designed to control the location of certain types
of "skid row" businesses. The Common Council of Detroit had determined that concentration
of such "uses" had a deleterious effect on surrounding neighborhoods. Until 1972, regulated
uses included Group "D" cabarets, establishments for the sale of beer or intoxicating liquor
for consumption on the premises, hotels or motels, pawnshops, pool or billiard halls, public
lodging houses, secondhand stores, shoeshine parlors, and taxi dance halls. In 1972 the Coun-
cil amended the list of regulated uses to include adult bookstores, adult motion picture
theatres, and adult mini motion picture theatres. American Mini Theatres, Inc. v. Gribbs,
518 F.2d 1014, 1015-17 (6th Cir. 1975).
3. Nortown Theatre, Inc. v. Gribbs, 373 F. Supp. 363 (E.D. Mich. 1974).
4. American Mini Theatres, Inc. v. Gribbs, 518 F.2d 1014 (6th Cir. 1975).
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zoning ordinance employing a content distinction that incidentally
affects free speech does not violate the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment. Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 96
S. Ct. 2440 (1976).
The overlap between the first amendment and the equal protec-
tion clause is an area of much uncertainty. In recent years the Su-
preme Court has applied a balancing test in free speech' and other
first amendment cases.' The importance of the first amendment
interests affected is weighed against the government's interests in
regulation.7 Equal protection challenges arise whenever a legislature
attempts to classify certain persons in a different manner from oth-
ers similarly situated. Equal protection challenges require a deter-
mination of whether differential treatment offered groups or classes
of individuals furthers an appropriate governmental interest.' Be-
cause it has never been faced with a situation in which both inter-
ests were present, the Supreme Court has not explicitly delineated
its standard of review where an equal protection challenge is based
on a classification which results in abridgment of the first amend-
ment guaranty of free expession.9
5. E.g.. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963); American Communications Ass'n v.
Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949).
6. E.g., Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson,
357 U.S. 449 (1958).
7. When particular conduct is regulated in the interest of public order, and the regula-
tion results in an indirect, conditional, partial abridgment of speech, the duty of the courts
is to determine which of the two conflicting interests demands the greatest protection under
the particular circumstances presented. American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S.
382, 399 (1950).
8. Articles which explore the Supreme Court's use of the equal protection clause and its
implications include Black, The Supreme Court, 1966 Term-Foreword: "State Action,"
Equal Protection and California's Proposition 14, 81 HARV. L. REV. 69 (1967); Cox, The
Supreme Court, 196,5 Term-Foreword: Constitutional Adjudication and the Promotion of
Human Rights, 80 HARV. L. REV. 91 (1966); Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971-Foreword:
In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection,
86 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1972); Karst & Horowitz, Reitman v. Mulkey: A Telophase of Substantive
Equal Protection. 1967 Sup. CT. REV. 39; Michelman, The Supreme Court 1968
Term -Foreword: On Protecting the Poor Through the Fourteenth Amendment, 83 HARV. L.
REV. 7 (1969); Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1065 (1969)
Ihereinafter cited as Developmentsl; Comment, Fundamental Personal Rights: Another
Approach to Equal Protection, 40 U. CHI. L. REV. 807 (1973).
9. In deciding both zoning and first amendment cases, the Supreme Court has usually
rested its decision on grounds other than equal protection. Therefore, the question of the
appropriate standard of review in these cases was undecided. As to first amendment cases,
see Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536
(1965); Developments, supra note 8, at 1128.
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The Supreme Court has established specific constitutional
guidelines to regulate governmental action undertaken in further-
ance of substantial governmental interests that indirectly restricts
first amendment rights."' The Court has employed a "balancing"
principle to uphold reasonable time, place, and manner regulations
of protected speech where the regulations have been the incidental
result of the government's attempt to further significant govern-
mental interests."
Although these Supreme Court precedents regarding regula-
tions of expression authorize the incidental infringement of first
amendment rights," the equal protection clause requires that
similarly situated individuals receive similar treatment. Tradition-
ally, the Court has applied a two-tiered analysis in determining the
outcome of equal protection challenges. Under the rational basis
or minimum scrutiny test of equal protection, no legislative classifi-
cation differentiating similarly situated indiviudals is to be set aside
"if any state of facts reasonably [might] be conceived to justify
it."" The compelling state interest or strict scrutiny test of equal
protection is invoked if the challenger demonstrates that the legisla-
tive scheme in question either utilizes a suspect classification'" or
10. The test for an ordinance which affects first amendment rights was succinctly stated
in United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968):
[Al government regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the constitu-
tional power of the Government; if it furthers an important or substantial govern-
mental interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free
expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms
is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.
11. See, e.g., Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972) (ban on willful making,
on grounds adjacent to a school, of any noise which disturbs the good order of the school
session); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559 (1965) (ban on demonstrations in or near a courthouse
with the intent to obstruct justice); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949) (limitation on use
of sound trucks).
12. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968); see cases cited in note 11 supra.
13. See sources cited in note 8 supra.
14. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 426 (1961). Earlier equal protection cases had
articulated the rational basis test in somewhat stricter terms. See, e.g., Royster Guano Co.
v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920) where the Court said that discriminatory legislation is
constitutional as long as "the classification ... be reasonable, not arbitrary, and . . . rest(s)
upon some ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the
legislation, so that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike." See generally
Tussman & tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CALIF. L. REv. 341 (1949).
15. Suspect classifications include those based on alidnage, Graham v. Richardson, 403
U.S. 365 (1971); race, Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); and ancestry, Oyama v. Califor-
nia, 332 U.S. 633 (1948).
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impings upon a fundamental right. " Judicial scrutiny is more rigor-
ous in this second tier, and the burden rests on the state to demon-
strate that the legislative classification promotes a compelling gov-
ernmental interest by the least restrictive legislation alternative.
7
In practice, almost all legislation subjected to minimum scrutiny
has been upheld, and legislation subjected to strict scrutiny has
been struck down. 8
Commentators have noted that the rigid two-tiered approach to
equal protection challenges has apparently been supplanted by a
three-tiered approach in which an intermediate standard is uti-
lized.6 Some formulations of this standard include a "sliding-scale"
model under which the intensity of judicial scrutiny varies with the
importance of the interest which is being infringed,'" and a
"substantial relationship in fact" test which involves a factual in-
quiry into whether the legislative classification is substantially re-
lated to the objective of the statute."
Although the Justices of the Supreme Court have been unable
to agree as yet on any one test as a rationale for their decisions,"2
16. Fundamental rights include the right to privacy, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973);
the right to vote, Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972); the right of interstate travel,
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); the right to adequate appellate review of a
criminal conviction, Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956); the right to marry and procreate,
Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942); and any other right "explicitly or implicitly
guaranteed by the Constitution," San Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 33-34
(1973).
17. See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
18. See Developments, supra note 8, at 1077-91.
19. See, e.g., Gunther, supra note 8; Comment, A Question of Balance: Statutory Classi-
fication under the Equal Protection Clause, 26 STAN. L. REV. 15 (1973).
20. See, e.g., San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 98-99
(1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting); 81 YALE L.J. 61, 71, 81-82 (1971).
21. See Gunther, supra note 8, at 20-21; 53 NEB. L. REV. 312, 317-18 (1974).
22. The Court is obviously divided regarding proper guidelines under equal protection
scrutiny. This diversity is illustrated by the five separate opinions handed down in San
Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973). Justice Powell, writing the
majority opinion, supported by Chief Justice Burger and Justices Blackmun, Rehnquist, and
Stewart, held that "[tlhe constitutional standard under the Equal Protection Clause is
whether the challenged state action rationally furthers a legitimate state purpose or interest."
411 U.S. at 55. Justice Stewart, concurring in the opinion and judgment of the Court, argued
that the McGowan v. Maryand, 366 U.S. 420, 426 (1961), test was still the applicable stan-
dard. 411 U.S. at 60. Justice Brennan, dissenting, argued that a stricter test of equal protec-
tion should have been utilized since '"fundamentality' is, in large measure, a function of the
right's importance in terms of the effectuation of those rights which are in fact constitution-
ally guaranteed." 411 U.S. at 62. Justice White, dissenting in an opinion which was supported
by Justices Douglas and Brennan apparently accepted Justice Powell's standard but felt that
[Vol. 31:713
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the Court has recognized that in equal protection scrutiny, it is
appropriate to consider whether a legislative distinction is based
upon the selective restriction of certain content of expression, rather
than on a particular kind of expression irrespective of content.3 In
Police Department of Chicago v. Mosley" an ordinance prohibited
any picketing, with the exception of peaceful labor picketing, within
a set distance from any school. The ordinance was struck down
because the Court found that it regulated first amendment rights
through content distinctions. 5 The Court, however, specifically rec-
ognized that sufficient regulatory interests may exist to justify selec-
tive exclusions or distinctions among types of picketing, but noted
that such content distinctions must be "carefully scrutinized" be-
cause first amendment rights are involved." Decided on the same
day as Mosley was Grayned v. City of Rockford27 in which an anti-
noise ordinance was upheld because it was "narrowly tailored to
further Rockford's compelling interest in having an undisrupted
school session conducive to the students' learning, and [did] not
unnecessarily interfere with first amendment rights.""5 As in
Mosley, the Court failed to elaborate on the test of equal protection
scrutiny appropriate to content distinctions. 9
In Lehman v. City of Shaker Heightsa the Supreme Court con-
sidered the refusal of a city transit system to allow a candidate for
its application should have produced the opposite result, that is, that the classification in
Rodriguez was not rationally related to the end sought to be achieved. 411 U.S. at 67. Finally,
Justice Marshall, dissenting in an opinion supported by Justice Douglas, argued for the
abolition of the two-tiered test altogether: that is, Court decisions do not fall into one of the
two neat categories-strict scrutiny or mere rationality-and that the Court has applied a
"spectrum of standards" in equal protection review. 411 U.S. at 98-99.
23. E.g., Erznoznik v. Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975); Lehman v. Shaker Heights, 418
U.S. 298 (1974); Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972); Police Dep't of Chicago v.
Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972).
24. 408 U.S. 92 (1972).
25. In holding that the ordinance was inconsistent with the requirements of the equal
protection clause, the Court stated that the ordinance "slip[pedl from the neutrality of time,
place, and circumstance into a concern about content." 408 U.S. at 99, quoting Kalven, The
Concept of the Public Forum: Cox v. Louisiana, 1965 Sup. CT. REV. 1, 29.
26. 408 U.S. at 98-99. Whether careful scrutiny in such a context entails strict scrutiny
is unclear because the specific terminology is not used. However, the overall effect of the
opinion seems to imply that strict scrutiny was applied.
27. 408 U.S. 104 (1972).
28. Id. at 119.
29. The Court described the anti-noise ordinance as a "reasonable regulation." Id. at
121.
30. 418 U.S. 298 (1974).
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public office to advertise, while it permitted commercial and
service-oriented advertising. In apparently applying the rational
basis or minimum scrutiny analysis,:" the Court concluded that the
distinction between types of advertising was within the city's discre-
tion and only incidentally affected free expression,2 In Erznoznik v.
City of Jacksonville" the Court held invalid on equal protection
grounds a municipal ordinance which declared that any movie con-
taining nudity which was visible from a public street was a public
nuisance. Justice Powell, speaking for the majority, concluded that
"the limited privacy interest of persons on the public streets cannot
justify this censorship of otherwise protected speech on the basis of
its content."" The Court implied that some judicial examination
beyond "rational basis" deference was approriate for constitutional
appraisal of content distinctions but did not elaborate further.35 '
The factual setting of the Mini Theatres case presented the
Court with the opportunity to clarify and develop its standards of
review with respect to equal protection challenges based on classifi-
cations which allegedly abridge a citizen's first amendment right to
free expression. Writing for the majority, Justice Stevens first deter-
mined that the regulation of the place where "adult" films could be
exhibited did not offend the first amendment." The Court found the
city's interest in planning and regulating the use of property for
commercial purposes to be "clearly adequate" to support the loca-
tional restriction. 7 To support this conclusion, the opinion noted
that Supreme Court precedent authorized reasonable time, place,
31. The Court found that the rationales for the selective exclusion constituted
"reasonable" legislative objectives. Id. at 304. The strict scrutiny test was not applied because
the limitation of advertising space to commercial and service-oriented advertising did not
"rise to the dignity" of a first amendment infringement. Id.
:22. The court held that because the city possessed only limited advertising space on the
transit system, it could restrict such advertising "in order to minimize chances of abuse, the
appearance of favoritism, and the risk of imposing upon a captive audience." Id.
33. 422 U.S. 205 (1975).
34. Id. at 212. In his dissent, Chief Justice Burger found the first amendment interests
involved to be "trivial at best" since there was only a requirement that the screen be shielded
from public view, and thus, no restriction on any "message." Id. at 223.
35. The Court specifically stated that under equal protection and the first amendment
even traffic regulations cannot discriminate on the basis of content "unless there are clear
reasons for the distinctions." 422 U.S. at 215. The ordinance was not rationally tailored to
support its asserted purpose as a traffic regultion because movies containing nudity posed
no greater threat. to traffic safety than did all other movies. Id. at 214-15.




and manner regulations of protected speech where those regulations
are necessary to further significant governmental interests."
The Court then addressed the question of whether the alleged
infringement upon first amendment rights of adult theatre owners
resulting from the classification was justified by the substantial
governmental interest served by the regulation. The Court con-
cluded that even though the zoning regulation was based on content
distinctions, the city's interest in the preservation of its neighbor-
hoods was sufficient justification for the incidental infringement on
the theatre owners' first amendment rights:
Since what is ultimately at stake is nothing more than a
limitation on the place where adult films may be exhibited, even
though the determination of whether a particular film fits that
characterization turns on the nature of its content, we conclude
that the city's interest in the present and future character of its
neighborhoods adequately supports its classification of motion
pictures. 9
The majority opinion in Mini Theatres does not discuss at any
length the appropriate test of equal protection. The Court did not
find an infringement of a fundamental right which would automati-
cally trigger strict scrutiny" nor did it employ the rational basis test
under which judicial deference to legislation is almost always auto-
matic." Unlike the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, which
38. Id. at 2448 and n.18. The opinion emphasized that the ordinances in no way limit
the content of material that may be shown or sold in the City of Detroit, but merely regulate
the place where adult material may be offered. Thus, the Court reasoned that the ordinances
simply regulate speech related conduct-the operation of adult bookstores and theatres-and
are not exacting a penalty based on a determination of obscenity. Viewed in this light, the
Court found the instant case squarely in line with the speech and conduct cases cited in
note 11 supra. In these cases, the Supreme Court enunciated the principle that upon a
showing of a strong governmental interest in regulating the non-speech aspect of first amend-
ment conduct, some incidental burden on the first amendment is permissible.
39. 96 S. Ct. at 2453 (1976) (footnote omitted).
40. Had the Court subjected the ordinance to strict scrutiny, in all likelihood the ordi-
nance would have been struck down. For a discussion of the rarity of finding a compelling
state interest under strict scrutiny, see Note, The Decline and Fall of the New Equal Protec-
tion: A Polemical Approach, 58 VA. L. REV. 1489, 1495 (1972); Comment, Fundamental
Personal Rights: Another Approach to Equal Protection, 40 U. Cii. L. REV. 807, 808 (1973).
A point emphasized by these discussions is that since a compelling interest is so rarely found,
the general rule is that determining strict scrutiny to be the proper test is the same as finding
the legislation to be unconstitutional.
41. Since 1926, the guidelines for reviewing the constitutionality of zoning regulations
have remained the same: such legislation is presumed valid unless it is shown to be arbitrary,
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applied the compelling state interest test,4" the Supreme Court ap-
parently employed an intermediate analysis in Mini Theatres.
Without reference to any one of the usual tests, the Court carefully
balanced the competing concerns of the city and the interests pro-
tected by the first amendment and found that the distinction be-
tween "adult" and "non-adult" theatres in the Detroit zoning ordi-
nance furthered a substantial governmental interest while only inci-
dentally infringing on first amendment rights."
The decision in Mini Theatres carries a significant message to
local zoning authorities: that is, disseminators of adult material can
be regulated by'the zoning power without resort to the convoluted
law of obscenity cases. It seems fair to say that the "adult" and
"non-adult" classification drawn by the zoning ordinance in Mini
Theatres represents justifiable distinctions. The city of Detroit de-
termined that only "adult," rather than "non-adult," theatres ad-
versely affected neighborhoods when concentrated in limited
areas." The city did not impose an outright ban on adult establish-
ments. As the district court found, adult establishments may locate
in "myriad locations in the City of Detroit" under the 1000 foot
provision."' The ordinance therefore exemplifies constitutional
"tailoring" to achieve a substantial governmental interest."
It is disappointing that the Supreme Court did not take advan-
tage of the opportunity in Mini Theatres to clarify and explicitly
delineate its standards of review in equal protection cases.47 While
capricious, or lacking a substantial relationship to the public health, morals, safety, or welfare
of the individual community. City of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926).
Rational basis analysis requires very little of zoning ordinances to maintain their validity
under equal protection analysis. Had the Court followed the traditional two-tiered approach,
subjecting the ordinance to minimum scrutiny, it would merely have had to reaffirm the
Euclid presumption of legislative validity to uphold the ordinance. See Developments, supra
note 8, at 1077-91.
42. The Sixth Circuit found the ordinance affected the theatre owners' fundamental
right of free expression. It held that although the classification promoted a compelling govern-
mental interest, it did not do so by the least restrictive legislative alternative. American Mini
Theatres, Inc. v. Gribbs, 518 F.2d 1014, 1020-21 (6th Cir. 1975).
43. 96 S. Ct. at 2453.
44. Id. at 2444-45.
45. 373 F. Supp. at 370.
46. See note 35 supra.
47. Mini Theatres emphasizes the need for a method of equal protection analysis that
can be sensitive to, and treat fairly, important competing interests. The case brings into sharp
focus the inherent weakness of the rigid two-tiered approach. On the one hand, although first
amendment rights are burdened, albeit slightly, an application of the rational basis test
[Vol. 31:713
the opinion provides some clues that a more flexible three-tiered
analysis will be employed in the future,4" it also indicates that the
court prefers to continue its case-by-case analysis of equal protec-
tion challenges, thereby preserving an uncertain status quo.
DAVID GOLD
Exclusionary Rule Does Not Extend to State
Seized Evidence Used in Federal Civil Tax
Proceedings
In a recent decision the United States Supreme Court refused to
exclude from admission in a federal civil tax proceeding evidence
seized illegally, but in good faith, by state law enforcement
officers. This note indicates that this decision reflects the Court's
growing disillusionment with the fourth amendment exclusionary
rule. It is argued that the opinion fails to recognize potential law
enforcement abuses which may flow from such a limitation of the
rule, and that. the Court did not expound upon the relevance of
the good faith character of the seizures to the holding.
In 1968, pursuant to a search warrant based partly on their
observations of alleged gambling activity, Los Angeles police seized
certain wagering records and $4,940.00 in cash from Max Janis and
arrested him for illegal gambling. As was customary in such cases,
the police informed the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) of their
observations, the seizures, and the arrest. On the basis of this infor-
would allow the ordinance to pass constitutional muster in furtherance of anyarguably valid
state objective. Such a standard seems to afford too little protection when one considers the
treatment historically afforded first amendment freedoms. On the other hand, a classical
application of the strict scrutiny test, which would almost surely result in declaring the
ordinance unconstitutional, gives too little deference to the traditionally and necessarily
broad zoning power.
48. The analysis employed in Mini Theatres requires minimum governmental concern
for individual rights and a substantial basis, rather than a compelling state interest, to justify
their restriction. Thus the flexible intermediate tier analysis is arguably a mere rational basis
test with "bite." See Gunther, supra note 8, at 21. However, the Supreme Court did not
formally introduce the test. The Court must decide if the flexible test will be added to create
a tertiary formula of equal protection or whether the two-tiered formula will remain intact.
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